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International Law and Terrorism:
Age-Old Problems, Different Targets
SHARON A. WILLIAMS*
INTRODUCTION
T IS A FACT AND SCOURGE of international life that international
terrorism knows no boundaries. A terrorist organization based in
one state may wreak havoc within the domain of other states by a
wide variety of methods. Over the last two and a half decades in
particular the international community has witnessed an accelera-
tion of attacks against civilian aircraft and civilian aviation facilities,
attacks on diplomats and other so-called "internationally protected
persons," and hostage-taking.
The spate of attacks against civil aviation prompted the adoption
by member states of the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) of the Tokyo,' Hague, ' and Montreal' Conventions. Like-
wise, attacks on internationally protected persons, including diplo-
mats, and hostage-taking gave the impetus for the I9744 and 1979'
international conventions on those subjects.
*LL.B., LL.M., D. Jur., Associate Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School,
York University, Ontario.
' Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts on Aircraft, 1963, 704
UNTS 219, 1970, Can. T. Ser. No. 5, hereinafter "Tokyo Convention."
2 Hague Convention for the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1970, 86o UNTS 105,
,972, Can. T. Ser. No. 23, hereinafter "Hague Convention."
3 Mont-Al Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety
of Civil Aviation, 1971, 974 UNTS 177, 1973 Can. T. Ser. No. 23, hereinafter
"Montreal Convention."
4 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Interna-
tionally Protected Persons including Diplomatic Agents, 1974 UNGA Res.
3166 (XXVII), 28 UN GADR Supp. (No. 30), 147, UN Doc. A/9o3o,
reprinted in (1974) 13 Int'l Leg. Mat. 41, hereinafter "IPP Convention."
5 The Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, x979, (1979) 18 Int'l Leg.
Mat. 1456, hereinafter "Hostages Convention."
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This piecemeal approach to dealing with terrorism was taken
because there was no chance of success in framing a single compre-
hensive treaty dealing with all types of acts.6 It was thought that this
fragmented and incremental approach would encourage many more
ratifications of most, if not all, the conventions.
Several recent incidents have brought home the realization that
much remains to be done in the fight not simply to combat but to
eradicate international terrorism. The attacks on the passenger ter-
minals in the Rome and Vienna airports in 1985, the hijacking of
the Italian cruise ship, the Achille Lauro, in 1985, the aerial destruc-
tion of the Air India jumbo jet en route from Canada to India in
1985 and the Pan Am flight from London to New York in 1988, and
the various hostage-taking incidents in Lebanon bring home in stark
terms the fact that there is a great deal to be done. The perceived
problems are at least threefold: first, a lack of treaty obligations
requiring extradition or prosecution in certain situations not covered
by the existing scheme of conventions; second, third party frustration
of the existing conventions; and third, the impact of the ideo-
logically motivated offender seeking publicity for a cause on the
treaty approach.
The real fear is that terrorists can use the lacunae in this area of
international law to attack certain targets and go free because there
will be enough safe-haven states to give them asylum and also enough
states that, even though not condoning the acts, will be incapable,
under their own domestic criminal laws, of either prosecuting them
because of lack of pertinent bases of jurisdiction over the offence, or
extraditing them because of the political offence exception to extra-
tion.
In this article the following issues of current significance will be
considered: first, should the eradication of the so-called "root causes"
of terrorism take precedence over conventions to suppress or punish
terrorists; second, the gaps that have been found in the existing
8 Note the 1937 Convention on Terrorism, Hudson, International Legislation,
vol. 7, at 862, which is the only global comprehensive treaty on terrorism. The
Convention never came into force as there was a failure on the part of the
states that signed to ratify. In fact only India did so. See also the 1977 Euro-
pean Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, 1977 E.T.S. No. 97, which
contains a composite approach following along the lines of the 1937 Conven-
tion. This Convention has been looked at as a major breakthrough, as it covers
terrorism in almost all its aspects. It demonstrates that the states belonging to
the Council of Europe, on account of their regional similarities, are capable,
at least in theory, of taking a more comprehensive tack. See also the European
Convention on Extradition, 1957 E.T.S. No. 98.
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multilateral convention approach to international terrorism, and
third, the steps that have been taken recently by the concerned
specialized agencies of the United Nations to remedy the situation.
ORDER OF PRIORITY: "ROOT CAUSES" OR NEW CONVENTIONS
As long as certain peoples view themselves as politically oppressed
and subjected to constant affronts to their human dignity, can there
be an end to violence to achieve their goals, whether they be political
and civil rights, a new government, territory, and so forth? Until the
deep-rooted causes of such violence are addressed, will the terror
threat always remain? It has been said, time and time again, that
terrorists are made, not born and that until, for example, the refugee
camps in the Gaza and West Bank are closed and the people granted
full human rights and freedoms as first class citizens of a country
whether in Israel, Arab states, or a Palestinian state; until the regime
of apartheid is decimated in Southern Africa; until a peaceful solu-
tion between the Christians, the Shiite Moslems, the Sunni Moslems,
and the Druse is found in Lebanon, the bloodshed and horror will
continue.
At first blush, an optimist would say "yes," the international com-
munity can end the hijackings, hostage-takings, bombings, and other
terrorist attacks by working urgently to solve the causes of these acts.
True, if the serious disorders and struggles for human dignity and
self-determination were to be dealt with adequately, then perhaps a
great proportion of the violence would cease. However, the optimist
should also be realistic. Even if the problems appeared to be solved
in one global area, this is not to say that other locales might not
develop new tensions. The process of cause-solving would have neces-
sarily to be ongoing. Also, even with dignity and territory achieved
by the "peoples" concerned, there may well be disaffected splinter
groups that might continue their struggle against the new govern-
ment and state. For some the tactics of intimidation by violence may
have become a way of life.
Obviously, the root causes must be stamped out - but it may take
time. These problems have been with us for decades and the solutions
are not going to appear like rabbits out of a conjurer's top hat. All
states must seek both inside and outside the United Nations to pro-
mote an early end to the suffering and misery of so many people who
are denied in many respects the most basic of human rights. However,
while working to cure the root causes, it is imperative that the world
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community take the international convention route to deter and if
not to prosecute and punish international terror-violence' against
internationally protected targets, as well as other measures such as
increased security at airports, harbours, and embassies, and con-
tinued mutual assistance and exchange of data.
Acts of violence should not be justified or condemned on the basis
of a subjective evaluation of the cause they were taken to promote.
To do so leads to interminable problems of distinction. No matter
how justifiable the political cause, certain acts are not acceptable at
international law. Attacks or threats to attack protected targets such
as innocent civilians, internationally protected persons, civil aviation,
and arguably other entities removed from government are to be
condemned without reservation. The unprecedented acceptance by
all member states of the United Nations in 1985 of the resolution
declaring that all methods of terrorism are to be condemned, regard-
less of where they occur and who the perpetrators are, supports this
argument.' This resolution adopted by consensus indicates that states
are conscious of the inherent dangers in terrorism to all. None are
immune. The Canadian delegate to the Sixth Committee of the
United Nations General Assembly declared in 1987 that "it is essen-
tial to bear in mind the importance of this achievement and to hold
fast to the unconditional condemnation ... in the General Assembly
against terrorism. '
Some states have argued that a definition of terrorism should be
produced that would differentiate it from national liberation struggles
and the use of force to that end.' It must be questioned seriously
7 See R. Friedlander, Terrorism: Documents of International and National
Control (3 vols., 1979). There have been countless articles written on this
subject generally as well as on its specific aspects. This is illustrated by the
comments contained in M. C. Bassiouni (ed.), Legal Responses to Inter-
national Terrorism: U.S. Procedural Aspects (1988). In particular, see there-
in M. C. Bassiouni, "A Policy-Oriented Inquiry into the Different Forms and
Manifestations of 'International Terrorism'," at xv.
8 UNGA Res. 40/6 x, Dec. 9, 1985.
9 P. Kirsch, Representative of Canada in the Sixth Committee, 42nd Session of
the General Assembly, Statement of Oct. 21, 1987, at 2 (original in French).
Note also the condemnation of terrorism made at the Venice Economic Sum-
mit on June 9, 1987, by the seven industrialized states and transmitted to the
General Assembly and Security Council of the United Nations: see UN Docs.
A/42/336 and S/18 9 13.
10 See the proposal by the Syrian Arab Republic to convene an international
conference to do this: UN Doc. A/42/1 9 3 . Note the support for this by
Democratic Yemen, Algeria, and Kuwait on behalf of the Group of Arab
states: UN Doc. A/42/1 9 3/ Add. 1-3.
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what this would in reality achieve. The Canadian delegation was of
the view that the answer was nothing,1 that to return to debate the
root causes and distinctions between illegal acts constituting terrorism
as opposed to justifiable acts of national liberation would be to take
steps backward and lose a unity of purpose by jeopardizing the agree-
ment on objectives gained over the years. 2 It would almost certainly
be impossible to get agreement on a general definition of terrorism as
it has been in the past. It is only by defining the criminality of conduct
without reference to political motivation that agreement is possible
between states of diverse ideological and sympathetic persuasions.
THE MULTILATERAL APPROACH TO DEALING WITH INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM: STOPPING THE GAPS
As the modes of international terrorism change, so must the
response of the international community. As was indicated at the
outset, no matter how morally or legally justifiable the cause, certain
targets must remain protected; this is vital to the self-preservation of
all humankind. The key international conventions until 1988 dealt
with hijacking," other unlawful acts against the safety of civil avia-
tion, 4 attacks on internationally protected persons including diplo-
matic agents,' 5 hostage-taking,'" and offences against nuclear ma-
terial.' The cornerstone of these conventions is ( I ) to ensure that as
many states as possible have a basis of jurisdiction over the offences,
including a basis founded on presence within the territory of the
prosecuting state, which can be viewed as a contemporary version
of the universal principle of jurisdiction; and (2) to provide for an
obligation on a state to either extradite to another state with jurisdic-
tion or to submit to its own authorities the case for the purposes of
prosecution in a serious fashion (aut dedere, aut judicare). Political
motivation does not operate to thwart the efficacy of these conven-
tions and, even if the political nature of the offence or the alleged
11 Supra note 9, at 6. Many other delegations took the same view and twenty
states together with Canada introduced draft resolution A/C.6/42/L.2, which
reaffirms and is largely based on the earlier resolution 40/61.
12 Ibid., 7.
Is Hague Convention on the Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 1970.
14 Montreal Convention, 1 97 1.
'5 IPP Convention, 1974.
10 Hostages Convention, 1979.
17 The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 1979, re-
printed in (979), Int'l Leg. Mat. x419.
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political motivation of the requesting state is the ground for refusal,
the obligation to submit the case for the purpose of prosecution
remains. It is thus not a case of political asylum beginning where
extradition fails.
However, it is only in these fairly restricted areas that these obliga-
tions exist. A smart international terrorist versed in the intricacies of
international co-operation in criminal matters until i988 would
know that the obligations did not cover ships, airport passenger ter-
minals, platforms fastened to the continental shelf, or the deep seabed.
Today intercontinental trains and buses are still not dealt with, and
perhaps futuristically space shuttles and the like and their on-site
space stations are not protected by the dual obligation of aut dedere,
aut judicare (extradite or prosecute).
This is not the appropriate time to analyze again the "old" conven-
tions already on the international books, but rather to look afresh at
the newest attempts by two specialized agencies of the United Nations
to contribute to the suppression, or rather eradication, of this scourge
of the twentieth century.
THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION AND THE 1988
PROTOCOL TO THE MONTREAL CONVENTION, 1971
The Tokyo, Hague, and Montreal Conventions were the initial
steps taken by the international community to deal with the spate of
terrorism in the air in the i96os and early 197os, but their step-by-
step approach clearly left serious gaps, such as terrorist violence at
airports serving civil aviation.'" The casual observer might question
the importance of these initial steps but, as primitive as it may seem,
the value of the international conventional obligation to extradite or
prosecute can act as a deterrent in many (if not all) cases and at
least is a symbolic condemnation by those states participating through
ratification or accession. The "gaps" are not so covered and the
political offence exception could, unless restricted by bilateral extra-
dition treaties, 9 operate with significant success, and detriment to
international peace and security.
18 For a recent summation of the work of ICAO in the area before adoption of
the 1988 Convention under consideration here, see the article by the late G. F.
FitzGerald, "Aviation, Terrorism and the International Civil Aviation
Organization," (1987) 25 Canadian Yearbook of International Law 219.
19 See, for example, the 1988 Protocol to the Extradition Treaty between Canada
and the United States of America, 1976 Can. T.S. No. 3. This Protocol, which
is not yet in force, will amend the treaty by limiting the political offence
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The 1985 Vienna20 and Rome2 airport terrorist assault incidents,
followed by the Frankfurt attack in 1985, presented the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) with a state of necessity for
action.2 2 No longer were incidents connected solely with aircraft in
flight2 or in service. 4 Innocent travellers in airport facilities were
being involved in random and indiscriminate acts. From its inception
the ICAO has been at the forefront of the attempt to curb the inter-
national terrorist threat. This specialized agency of the United
Nations has the experience and expertise to understand the diplo-
matic pitfalls in producing any multilateral treaty and also is aware
of the importance of its role in protecting the safety of civil aviation,
its facilities, and consequent individuals involved.
Airports can be viewed as a type of international crossroads. In
the busiest of the world's airports thousands of passengers are handled
every day. Aircraft flights arrive and depart from all' parts of the
world. Clearly, they present an extremely tempting target for ter-
rorist action. The state that is the scene of the terror-violence may in
no way be directly involved in the dispute between the terrorists and
another state.
At the 26th Session of the Assembly of ICAO in 1986, Canada
and several other states2' recommended that the Assembly include
exception to the greatest extent. See Art. 4. Similarly, see the new extradition
treaty of 1987 between Canada and India which in Art. 5 contains a similar
restriction.
20 The El Al check-in counter was the target and two passengers were killed and
39 wounded.
21 This incident occurred on Dec. 27, 1985, in front of the El Al check-in counter.
The terrorists opened fire with guns and grenades and 15 people were killed
and 77 wounded.
22 The following non-exhaustive list of airport violence reinforces the problem:
1973, 3 incidents (Calvi; Rome; Athens); 1974, 2 incidents (Heathrow; Los
Angeles); 1975, 2 incidents (Orly; La Guardia); 1976, 4 incidents (Tel
Aviv; Delhi; Beirut; Ajaccio); 1979, 2 incidents (Frankfurt) ; 1981, 2 inci-
dents (Collingwood; Cairo); 1982, 2 incidents (Miami; Los Angeles); 1983,
2 incidents (Narita; Orly); 1984, 2 incidents (Kabul; Beirut); 1985, 4 inci-
dents (Frankfurt; Vienna; Rome; Narita). Note the European Conference
of Ministers Responsible for Combatting Terrorism, Strasbourg, Nov. 4-5,
1986, Rec. 1024 (1986) Doc. 5518 on the European Response to Terrorism.
23 Montreal Convention, Art. 2 (a).
24 Montreal Convention, Art. 2 (b).
25 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Chile, Columbia, Denmark, France, Finland,
Greece, Iceland, India, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Mexico, Norway, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, and Uganda.
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as a high priority, in the program of work of its legal committee, the
matter of a possible agreement on the suppression of unlawful acts
of violence at airports serving international air transportation."
States generally, regardless of their political sympathies, have an
undeniable interest in the safety of their own airports and passengers
and employees therein and also in the fate of their citizens while they
sojourn abroad. In terms of sheer numbers, the variety of nationali-
ties, and hence widespread publicity, airports used for international
air transportation offer an attractive target for attack. The initiative
taken by Canada and the other states was aimed at preventing
unlawful acts at such airports through enhanced co-operation, but
also at ensuring that the perpetrators, if able to do their deadly deeds,
would not go unprosecuted and, if found guilty, would be punished.
The time was clearly ripe for a new international initiative. Some 7
had doubted whether ICAO would be capable of it, on account of
the consultative status at ICAO of the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion (PLO). In the event, this pessimism, at least at the diplomatic
conference level, was not warranted. The matter was referred by the
Executive Committee to the Legal Committee and in that Com-
mittee, the recommendation was supported by all delegations; it was
agreed that the highest priority be accorded to this matter.2" This
recommendation by the Legal Committee was also the subject of a
resolution adopted unanimously by the Assembly of ICAO,29 which
called upon the Council of ICAO to include the subject of such a
draft instrument in the work program of the Legal Committee, as a
subject of the highest priority, and to convene as early as possible in
1987 a meeting of the Legal Committee to draft an instrument with
a view to adoption at a diplomatic conference as soon as was prac-
ticable, preferably before the end of 1987.
At the behest of the Council of ICAO a Special Sub-Committee of
the Legal Committee was convened" in early January 1987 to imple-
ment the Assembly's resolution. It considered the subject of the resolu-
26 Doc. A26-WP/4i, EX/9, 14/7/86.
27 E.g., see Green, L. C., "Terrorism and International Law," Research Report,
Institute of Jewish Affairs, in Association with the World Jewish Congress
(1981), 11.
28 See ICAO Doc. 9 5 02-LC/ 186 (1987), at 4-s.
29 Res. A26-4. See ibid., at i and 4-I.
20 Ibid. The Sub-Committee was established by the Chairman of the Legal Com-
mittee under Rule 12 (b) of the Rules of Procedure of the ICAO Legal Com-
mittee. See ibid., 4-1.
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tion on the basis of a study and draft text prepared by the Rappor-
teur.3 ' The Sub-Committee itself prepared a draft text for further
consideration by the Legal Committee. Under the rules of procedure
of ICAO, a working group was created to consider the text prepared
by the Sub-Committee in the light of state views, to attempt to nar-
row the scope of differences that remained, and to prepare a text or
texts for further consideration by the Legal Committee. 2 The Cana-
dian Chairman of the Working Group presented to the Committee
the text of the Preamble and the Committee approved a draft text.
The result was not that far off the timing indicated in the Assem-
bly's resolution. On February 24, 1988, a Protocol to the Montreal
Convention was adopted by consensus at a diplomatic conference.
In general terms, it was agreed that the new instrument should not
depart from the basic principles of the Hague and Montreal Con-
ventions and it should seek only to supplement the Montreal Con-
vention. For this reason, it was agreed that the new instrument
should not take the form of a new convention but of a Protocol to
the Montreal Convention of 197 1. It would not change the substan-
tive parts of the earlier convention, but would be supplemental and
add to the definitions of offences additional acts not addressed.3
The supplementary protocol route was the less controversial of the
two options. To produce a new convention would have caused all the
"old chestnuts" to resurface: exclusion or inclusion of self-determina-
tion units; treaties of asylum; the political offence exception; and the
"anti-Entebbe" clause."
The draft text approved by the Legal Committee and adopted by
consensus by the diplomatic conference in February 1988 considered
that unlawful acts of violence at airports serving civil aviation jeop-
ardize the safety of persons and property at such airports and, inter
alia, disturb the safe and orderly conduct of civil aviation for all
countries. Article 2 (I ) of the 1988 Protocol provides that Article i of
the Montreal Convention shall be followed by a new paragraph,
81 Dr. R. D. van Dam (The Netherlands) was appointed Rapporteur under Rule
1 7 of the Rules of Procedure of the ICAO Legal Committee by the Chairman.
Ibid.
32 Supra note 28, at 4-10.
33 See the Sub-Committee Report on the Development of an instrument for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International
Civil Aviation, Montreal, January 1987, LC/SC-VIA, Part 1I, 5. Note also
Art. i of the Protocol itself.
34 Supra note 28, at 4-27.
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Article i ( i ) bis. Article i ( i ) bis" provides that any person commits
an offence if he [or she] unlawfully and intentionally, using any
device, substance, or weapon, acts violently against a person at an
airport that serves civil aviation, which act causes or is likely to cause
death or serious injury, or if that person destroys or seriously damages
the facilities of an airport serving international civil aviation or aircraft
not in service located thereon or disrupts the services of the said
airport, if such an act is likely to endanger or endangers safety at that
airport. Article 2 (2) of the Protocol covers attempts to do the above.
Article 3 of the Protocol states that the new Article 5 ( 2 ) bis to follow
Article 5 of the Convention will ensure jurisdiction over such offences
and the obligation to extradite or prosecute.
In the context of its deliberations the Legal Committee decided
and it was later accepted by the Assembly that the international
element was vital for the applicability of the Protocol. Several delega-
tions were of the view that this international element was to be found
in the concept of the "airport serving international civil aviation."
It was agreed by the Committee that the definition of that term
should be based on fact, rather than on a matter of strict legal defini-
tion." It was noted that the existing Montreal Convention and
Annexes did not contain a definition of "airport" or "international
airport" or "airport serving international aviation" and it appeared
that no difficulties of a practical nature had so far surfaced. A plain
reading of Article 2 of the Protocol indicates that it will apply fairly
widely to all acts of violence or destruction connected with an airport
serving international civil aviation. It is not limited in scope but
refers to facilities of such an airport or aircraft not in service. Facili-
ties are not defined and it could be argued that it means facilities
located inside and outside of the airport structure.
Concerning the new offence contained in new paragraph i bis to
the Montreal Convention, the crucial element is that the act "endan-
gers or is likely to endanger safety at that airport." The Rapporteur,
Mr. van Dam of the Netherlands, in his draft text before the Sub-
Committee had proceeded also to define what was meant by this
condition. His definition read as follows:
For the purpose of paragraph i bis, the safety of civil aviation shall be
deemed to be endangered, if the offences contemplated in subparagraphs
(a) and (b) of paragraph Ibis of Article i are committed in an area of
35 Ibid., 4-27.
36 Ibid., 4-5.
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the airport where measures necessary in relation to the commencement
or completion of an international journey by air are carried out, and
cause or are likely to cause (grievous) injury or death or serious damage
or destruction in that area.'
This definition caused controversy in the special Sub-Committee.
One bone of contention was that the provision would set a presump-
tion that would "hardly be acceptable" in the field of criminal law. 8
Another criticism was that it would cover many acts that were unre-
lated to civil aviation and did not warrant international criminaliza-
tion and subjection to the principle of aut dedere, aut judicare. The
recurring example (for some unknown reason!) before the Sub-
Committee of an act that should be regarded as a "private"39 type
of violence and not within the purview of the Protocol was that of a
criminal offender attacking his mother-in-law in a critical area of an
airport. Some members, however, argued that even such a case could
result in danger to the safety of civil aviation if it was committed with
certain types of weapons or explosives, as other innocent bystanders
might be endangered and so too the operation of the airport.4 In
the end the Sub-Committee agreed that motive should not be viewed
as relevant but the only factor of weight should be "the objective
effect,"'" that of danger to international civil aviation.
One last comment is necessary on the subject of new paragraph 2
bis to Article 5 of the Montreal Convention concerning jurisdiction
over the offence and extradition. The i988 Protocol has a novel fea-
ture that is also restrictive as it stipulates that the state where an
alleged offender is present shall take measures necessary to establish
its jurisdiction over the offences where it does not extradite to the
state where the offence was committed. It is not unusual to give
priority to extradition where prosecution via jurisdiction on the uni-
versal basis is the sole alternative. All of the pre-existing anti-terrorist
conventions are couched in such terms. However, the Protocol adds a
twist; extradition is restricted to the state with the territorial basis of
jurisdiction and does not provide for any other potential bases such
as the active and passive nationality principles. The Sub-Committee
had suggested that extradition should be referrable to any of the states
3T It would have been included as para. 2 bis to Art. 4 of the Montreal Conven-
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mentioned in Article 5 ( x) of the Montreal Convention.4 2 The Legal
Committee, however, was of the view that the bases contained therein
comprising the state of registration of aircraft, against the state where
the aircraft on which the offence was committed lands with the of-
fender still on board, and the state of the principal place of business or
permanent residence of an operator of a leased aircraft or on board
of which an offence has occurred, had no relevance to the new
offence contained in the Protocol. It was of the view that the state in
whose territory the offence was perpetrated has the closest link with
the crime and the most interest in initiating a prosecution. This is in
keeping with the view of most common law jurisdictions that priority
be given to the territorial basis of jurisdiction on account of the
factors mentioned and also the location of evidence and witnesses.
It does not appear that there was any discussion of Article 5(3)
of the Montreal Convention that provides that the Convention does
not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with
national law. This would allow a number of other bases to operate
under the 1971 Montreal Convention. The Protocol as adopted rules
these out for Article i, paragraph i bis offences. The only states
concerned are the state where the alleged offender (or criminal
where an escapee) is found and the place where the offence occurred.
The Committee noted that in this case, as opposed to other inter-
national terrorist offences covered by the multilateral conventions,
there could not be competing claims for extradition as only one state
has the prospect of making the request for it. On this account it is
worth repeating that the Committee stressed the priority of extra-
dition."2
Of the many contributions on this matter by various delegations
it is worthwhile to single out the proposals of two states. The Nether-
lands in its proposal' had an interesting concept that the state where
the offender is found to be present is only obliged to prosecute where
that state does not comply with an extradition request from the state
with territorial jurisdiction."5 The Netherlands explained that juris-
diction to prosecute should not be imposed if an extradition request
is not made. This proposal did not find favour with the Committee.
It would have been a radical departure from the other existing
Conventions, including most importantly the 1971 Montreal Con-
42 Supra note 28, at 4-18.
43a Ibid., 4-20.
44 ICAO Doc. LC/26-WP/ 4 -6.
45 Supra note 28, at 4-19.
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vention. None of these makes prosecution contingent on an extradi-
tion request being made and being refused. The Netherlands stated
that in relation to the earlier conventions its government had made
reservations with respect to some of them in a similar vein to its pro-
posal and that such a reservation might also be made with respect
to the Protocol. The big question that presents itself is why The
Netherlands felt the need to do this? It may be speculated that The
Netherlands does not want to be burdened with a political and
administrative "hot potato" when the offender is found there and
no other state makes a request. As the then chairperson of the
Working Group has noted recently, "the Dutch have traditionally
been plagued by offenders being dropped off by planes or ships, on
their territory, leaving them with all [the] obligations and none of the
evidence connected with the case."4'
In the case of the Soviet Union the reasoning may have been quite
different." The USSR proposal was to include a provision that pre-
ference in extradition should be given to the state in which the airport
where the offence was committed, was located. This clearly ties in
with the territorial approach and was probably just a reinforcement
of the Soviet wish to have priority in prosecuting those committing
offences against Soviet targets; in the negotiations leading to the
earlier conventions the Soviet delegation had repeatedly requested
compulsory extradition in such circumstances to the territorial state
of registry of an aircraft. In this case, they were the most successful
to date in attaining favourable wording.
The Soviet Union also made another very relevant point in its
same proposal." It concerned airport security. As a practical matter
airport security through sanitized security zones and ultra-trained per-
sonnel may be the answer from a deterrence point of view. The Soviet
view was that the Protocol should include some provisions dealing
with security and putting legal obligations on states to prevent violent
acts at airports serving international civil aviation within their
territory. Article io(i) of the i971 Montreal Convention provides
that contracting states are obliged in accordance with international
46 Kirsch, "The x988 ICAO and IMO Conferences Against Terrorism and a
Look at History: Will the Consensus Hold?," unpublished speech given in his
capacity as Director, Legal Operations Division, Dept. of External Affairs,
Canada, at a dinner meeting of the International Law Association, Ottawa
Branch, May 18, 1988.
47 Supra note 28, at 4-5.
48 Ibid., 4-5.
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and national law to take all practicable measures for the purpose of
preventing crimes listed in Article i. The USSR determined that
Article io could be amended by the Protocol to include a specific
obligation to provide for the presence of duly authorized and trained
security personnel at airports as well as inspections and monitoring
of these measures and the establishment of rules to prohibit and pre-
vent unauthorized access of persons or of means of transport into
controlled zones and other zones that are important for airport
operations. 9 This proposal was not accepted. One reason given was
that it would require a definition of "controlled zone" at an airport
and the Committee had already abandoned that task at an earlier
stage of their deliberations.5 °
It is obvious that certain security measures over and above those
regularly entertained could only ameliorate the present situation. To
name but a few potential sources of problems: (i) baggage should
not be capable of direct check-in from state A to state C where A is
the state of initial embarkation and C the final destination, if a
change of planes must occur in state B and the passenger will be in
transit. Lack of security in state A may allow a bag to be checked
with explosives on timers that will not explode until the second leg
of the journey on a different aircraft; (2) curbside baggage checks
should be discontinued, as bags may be checked in this manner and
the prospective passenger not board the plane; and (3) new hightech
detection devices must be used to scan baggage to check for explo-
sives. Passengers must also be conditioned to arrive earlier at airports
and be prepared for intensive security.
For an airport to be made secure against terrorist attack, it must
be seen much differently than it is today. It cannot be an open area;
the procedures for security must be sophisticated and tight. It clearly
is not conducive to the holiday atmosphere for tourists to see watch-
towers, guard dogs, barbed wire, and so on, but these and other
measures are warranted if they will deter terrorist acts. Perhaps entry
points to airport terminals should be guarded; friends and relatives
not allowed to enter, and lockers be a thing of the past; restaurants
and other shopping facilities only be located beyond the second
secured checkpoint. Once a passenger has handed in his or her ticket,
been assigned a seat, and checked bags, perhaps there should be no
ability to walk out of the terminal without investigation. There
49 Ibid., 2'8, 4-20-4-21.
50 Ibid., 4-2 1.
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should be a rigid check that prospective passengers who checked the
baggage are on the plane in question. While this will not thwart the
suicidal terrorist, it may deter others more concerned with their own
safety. Baggage must be matched to passengers at the gate before
boarding and non-identified pieces put in a security zone. To detect
the suicidal type of terrorist, the checked luggage must be searched
again at this stage for certain types of chemical explosives. Of less
obvious note, but equally serious nature, all other cargo and catering
services and cleaning personnel would undergo the same treatment.
One might go even further and suggest that not only outgoing but
incoming passengers and their baggage should go through the same
procedures. Strict security should extend to all aircraft and ground
staff. Far more security background investigations should take place,
plus on the spot checks.
All these techniques would require technology and personnel. The
result would be higher costs to air travellers passed through the air-
line industry. Without a doubt it would either mean delays or greatly
increased time expenditures before a flight. The challenge is to
protect all persons and facilities involved without going overboard
in creating a pallisade structure. There must be a balance struck. As
in all other debates on terrorism, if states react by turning their
territories into fortresses and repress civil liberties as generally per-
ceived, the terrorist forces will have achieved success.
A final question is who may sign, ratify, or accede to the Protocol.
At the debate stage some delegations appeared to wish the participa-
tion of states that are not parties to the Montreal Convention of i97 1,
in the Protocol of I988." This would not have been desirable or
practical. The accepted policy of ICAO, and even of the United
Nations itself, is to encourage states to become parties to all the multi-
lateral anti-terror violence conventions. Thus it would have been a
reversal of policy to allow non-parties of the Montreal Convention,
for reasons known only to themselves, to obligate themselves by the
new Protocol alone. Article 5 of the Protocol as adopted provides in
paragraph 2 that "Any State which is not a Contracting State to the
Convention may ratify this Protocol if at the same time it ratifies or
accedes to the Convention in accordance with Article 15 thereof." 2
ICAO with its proven track record was well-versed specifically in
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pitfalls of diplomatic wrangling and horse-trading. The amendment,
drafted as a supplemental Protocol and not a brand-new convention,
was relatively speaking plain sailing for such an experienced body
concerned with air safety. The right accommodations were struck
and, as with all multilateral agreements, the result is a package
acceptable to all concerned. After all, it is in the interest of all states
from all geopolitical groups, whatever their sympathies for certain
causes, to protect their own airports and aviation facilities and people,
both citizens and foreigners, therein. Likewise, it is in their interest
to have maximum protection for their own citizens when they travel
abroad.
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME TERRORISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL
MARITIME ORGANIZATION'S 1988 CONVENTION AND PROTOCOL
It is amazing that there has not been much more international
maritime terrorism. The seizure of the cruise ship, the Achille Lauro,
in 1985 highlighted in the world perception the problem." As with
aircraft, ships, especially cruise liners engorged with multinational
tourists, present a tempting target for those who wish to gain either
fulfilled demands from target states or simply, but importantly to
them, publicity for their cause especially from the world press and
television. Cruise ships and any vessel of the merchant marine are
vulnerable to terrorist attack, as they usually will be navigating solo
and will not be heavily armed.
As with other areas of international personal security from ter-
rorism, the loopholes have been larger than the actual coverage.
Maritime transport as well as other transboundary territorial modes
have been left aside. Only aviation has been dealt with because of
the work of ICAO. The same comments made above about airport
security can be made here. How stringent are the measures taken in
the port state to vet baggage-handlers, porters, stewards, staff, crew,
let alone passengers and friends and family wishing a "bon voyage"?
The situation was clearly ripe for the taking. The facts of the Achille
Lauro seizure would appear to demonstrate that a maritime hijacking
was not the intent of the hijackers but rather that the vessel was only
to be a means of their gaining entry as tourists to the Israeli port of
53 There have been other instances, such as the seizure in 1975 of the Suehiro
Maru in Malsugat Bay in the Philippines by members of the Moro Liberation
Front. See H. Stephens, "Maritime Terrorism and Piracy: Problems and
Solutions in the Mid-i98os," in Y. Alexander (ed.), The 1986 Annual on
Terrorism 165 (1987).
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Ashdod to carry out terrorist action there. The discovery of their
dubious status by a steward caused the take-over and subsequent
events.
Whether one looks at this as an "accidental" or planned seizure, it
makes little difference as the legal issues are the same. Lax security
measures at the port of embarkation allowed the terrorists, under
assumed names and with forged passports, to get on board. Whatever
their ultimate intent, they in fact seized the cruise ship, murdered
one passenger, Leon Klinghoffer, a United States citizen, and held
many others hostage until their release.
Nevertheless, it was this incident, which within reason should have
been quite predictable, that caused a flurry of rapid activity,54 by
international standards. It is not the purpose of this article and space
does not permit a recounting of the Achille Lauro facts; the key fea-
ture is simply that a group of persons took over a ship with people on
board of various nationalities and held them hostage. Neither is it
the purpose of this article to review whether the United States action
in bringing down the Egyptian airplane that was carrying the hi-
jackers to safety, was or was not in violation of international law.55
On March i o, 1988 the International Maritime Organization, a
specialized agency of the United Nations, adopted two international
instruments by consensus and not by a vote. As with the ICAO 1988
Protocol to the 1971 Montreal Convention, this adoption by con-
sensus indicates that states were happy with the overall package deal.
But it may be questioned whether the level of ambiguity that results
from adoption by consensus is in the long term profitable. However,
those who never try to climb never fall; so it is that in the attempt to
curb the international cancer of terrorism we must grasp at any
54 See ibid., 172, where the author states to the contrary that reactions to the
Achille Lauro affair was "long on symbolism, but short on substance." How-
ever, this article was written before the adoption of the 1988 Rome Conven-
tion. At the stage of his writing, the IMO had only in 1986 adopted a non-
binding resolution expressing concern about maritime terrorism with the
recommendation that states adopt more stringent security measures for pas-
senger ships and their ports of call.
55 See e.g., on the Achille Lauro, G. Constantinople, "Towards a New Definition
of Piracy: The Achille Lauro Incident," (1986) 26 Va. J. Int'l L. 723; J.
McCredie, "Contemporary Issues of Force Against Terrorism: The United
States Response to Achille Lauro- Questions of Jurisdiction and Its Exer-
cise," (1986) 16 Ga. J. Int'l and Comp. L. 435; G. McGingley, "The Achille
Lauro Affair: Implications for International Law," (985) 52 Tenn. L. Rev.
691 ; and J. Paust, "Extradition and United States Prosecution of the Achille
Lauro Hostage-Takers: Navigating the Hazards," (1987) 20 Vand. J. Int'l
L. 235.
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potential method of doing so. These instruments are at least the
foundation upon which, with increased international co-operation,
an effective defence against terrorist violence may be built in the
future.
In the case of maritime terrorism, the IMO for the first time had
to deal with international criminal law and the questions of juris-
diction, extradition, and other manifold complications. The 1988
Rome Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation56 and the 1988 Protocol for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms
Located on the Continental Shelf 7 go through the ambit of matters
raised in the preceding ICAO Conventions, the Internationally Pro-
tected Persons Convention (IPP), the Hostages Convention, and
the Nuclear Material Protection Convention.
As with the Hostages Convention, the Rome Convention addresses
the progressive elimination of the root causes of terrorism in the
preamble but has no actual article in the Convention itself that deals
with that matter, including colonialism, racism and other flagrant
forms of alien domination, and violations of human rights. Neither is
there a covering restriction reaffirming the legitimacy of self-deter-
mination units to use force towards that end as occurred with the IPP
Convention. An attempt was made by Libya to have an article
included that would, like Article 12 of the Hostages Convention,
state that the Convention would not apply to situations covered by
the laws of armed conflict. However, it was not accepted since on a
factual basis offences under the Rome Convention would not have
parallels in the Geneva Conventions and Protocols.
The Council of the IMO decided in June 1987, in accordance
with Article 2 (b) of the Convention on the International Maritime
Organization, 9 to convene an international conference on the sup-
pression of unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation.
The Assembly of the Organization endorsed this decision at its
fifteenth regular session by resolution A.63 3 (5) of November 20,
1987." The intended purpose of the proposed conference was to
consider the adoption of treaties on terrorist acts against maritime
navigation and fixed platforms on the continental shelf.
56 IMO Doc. SUA/CONF/i 5 , Mar. io, 1988.
57 IMO Doc. SUA/CONF/16, Mar. 1o, 1988.
58 UNGA Res. 3166 (XXVIII), Sept. 14, ,973.
59 IMO Doc. SUA/CONF/WP. i, Mar. 9, 1988, at z.
60 Ibid.
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The conference was convened in Italy in March i988. Seventy-
six states participated in the Conference.81 These states represented
a wide cross-section of member states of the United Nations; it was
not the case (and the same is true at ICAO) that only "victim" states
of international terrorism were represented. Not only were the West-
ern Europeans, Canada, Israel, Japan, and the United States present,
but also among others the socialist states of Eastern Europe, Arab and
African states and specifically Algeria, the Islamic Republic of Iran,
Iraq, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiria, and the Syrian Arab
Republic. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) also sent
observers to the Conference.
The draft treaty texts were prepared by the Ad Hoc Preparatory
Committee, which had been established by the IMO Council. This
Committee had used as the basis of its drafts an initial text prepared
by Austria, Egypt, and Italy. 2 The aim of the draft convention was
clearly to fill the gap regarding suppression of acts of terrorism related
to maritime traffic. Until the adoption of the 1988 Rome Convention
and Protocol, the only possible coverage was from a strictly maritime
perspective by reference to Article 1 5 of the Geneva Convention on
the High Seas, 1958,63 and Article ioi of the 1982 Montego Bay
Convention on the Law of the Sea 4 concerning acts of piracy under
the law of nations. These articles are not particularly apt. They deal
with acts of violence committed for private ends by the crew or pas-
sengers of a private ship on the high seas against another ship or
persons thereon. These articles, therefore, clearly only relate to a
small number of international criminal acts committed for private
ends and also with two vessels being involved. Even though some
would suggest65 that these articles do not rule out piracy defined more
liberally in accordance with the norms of customary international
law, and that maritime hijackings as in the case of the Achille Lauro
are customary law international crimes, this would not be that profit-
able from a treaty law reference point of view. Even if it were ac-
cepted, and this is by no means certain, that acts of piracy do encom-
pass such scenarios, the only effect would be to declare the perpetra-
61 Ibid., 1-2.
62 IMO Doc. PCUA 2/2. See IMO Doc. PCUA 2/5, June 2, 1987, at 2 and
IMO Doc. PCUA 1/3, Feb. 3, 1987, at x.
63 450 UNTS 82.
64 Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, Off. Rec., Vol. XVII, at 139;
reprinted in ( 1982) 21 Int'l Leg. Mat. 1245.
65 Supra note 55.
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tors hostis humanis and allow potentially for universal jurisdiction.
However, no provision of aut dedere, aut judicare would apply. It
should be added that the 1979 United Nations Convention on the
Taking of Hostages would apply in all probability to cases of mari-
time hijackings, with reference to the persons held rather than to the
maritime locus. However, on closer inspection there are problems in
this line of argument. Article i ( i ) of the 1979 Convention bases the
offence of hostage-taking upon the aim of compelling a third party
to do or to abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit
condition of releasing the person/s held hostage. Should a case of
maritime hijacking occur for publicity for a cause rather than tar-
getting a particular state or other third party, the 1979 Convention
would not apply.
The 1988 Rome Convention reads generally like the earlier inter-
national conventions. The IMO was able to model the offences on
those delineated with respect to aircraft in the Hague and Montreal
conventions. The aim is emphatically to suppress in a comprehensive
fashion unlawful acts against maritime navigation that endanger
innocent human lives, put in jeopardy the safety of persons and prop-
erty, and affect seriously the operation of maritime services. Such
acts are of grave concern not only to involved states but to the well-
being of humanity as a whole.
For the purposes of this Convention, a "ship" means a vessel of
any type that is not attached permanently to the seabed, including
dynamically supported craft, submersibles, and other floating craft.
Initially, at the second session of the Ad Hoc Preparatory Commis-
sion, although there was general support for the definition of "ship"
in Article i, there was some question as to the phrase "dynamically
supported craft." It was recalled that at the first session this term was
chosen as it was more modern and comprehensive than the alterna-
tive "hydrofoil boats and air-cushion vehicles" that was placed in the
original draft."8 It is interesting to note that Article 2 lists the types of
vessels, such as warships, that the Convention does not apply to. It
would seem that this exemption was included so as not to prejudice
the immunities under customary and conventional international law
accorded to ships owned and operated by states for non-commercial
purposes. 7
60 IMO Doc. PCUA 2/5, June 2, 1987, at 4.
67 See Rome Convention z988, Art. 2(2) and IMO Doc. PCUA 2/5 at 7.
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Article 3 (1) provided for the definition of the offence. Offences
are committed by any person who unlawfully and intentionally seizes
or exercises control over a ship by force or by threat of force or any
other force of intimidation; or who performs an act of violence
against a person or aboard a ship if that act is likely to endanger the
safe navigation of that ship; or who places or causes to be placed on
a ship, by any means, devices or substances likely to destroy the ship
or cause damage to the vessel or its cargo; or which endangers or is
likely to endanger the safe navigation of the ship; or who destroys or
seriously damages maritime navigational facilities or seriously inter-
feres with their operation, if such is likely to endanger the safe naviga-
tion of the ship; or who communicates information known by him or
her to be false and thereby endangers the safe navigation of the ship;
or who injures or kills anyone in connection with the commission or
the attempted commission of any of the offences so far mentioned.
It is only this latter offence that strikes a new note and goes beyond
analogies to the Hague and Montreal conventions. It would deal with
the situation faced in the Achille Lauro when Leon Klinghoffer, an
American citizen, was murdered. Some delegations 8 wished it deleted
from the draft. Other delegations considered it to be an aggravating
provision and not a separate substantive offence, and wished it to be
put in a separate paragraph. 9 Still others considered that the killing
of persons in the course of unlawful acts against on-board maritime
vessels was fundamental and needed to be specifically addressed as a
separate offence."° The latter view prevailed. Thus, it is only the
Rome Convention along with the IPP Convention that makes it a
criminal offence to kill or injure a person. Neither the civil aviation
conventions nor the Hostages Convention do so. To have failed to
have included it would have been a glaring omission, as it is in these
other treaties. As it stands, inclusion in the list of offences brings into
play the aut dedere, aut judicare principle.
Article 3 (2) provides for attempts, abetting the commission of an
offence, or being an accomplice and threatening, with or without a
condition, to compel a person, whether juridical or physical, to do or
to refrain from doing any act, to commit any of the aforegoing
offences, if that threat is likely to endanger the safe navigation of the
ship in question.
68 Ad Hoc Preparatory Committee, ist Sess. Agenda item 4, IMO Doc. PCUA/
14, Mar. 16, 1987, para. 30.
69 Ibid.
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At the second session of the Ad Hoc Preparatory Commission, the
Kuwaiti delegation proposed the inclusion of an application of the
provisions of Article 3 to a person who commits an offence on behalf
of a government. Kuwait explained this proposal as an attempt to
suppress politically motivated unlawful acts constituting an outrage
to humanity, regardless of the status of the perpetrators.7' This basic
principle was already contained and is contained in the preamble to
the Rome Convention as adopted which refers to the unequivocal
condemnation of all acts of terrorism wherever and by whomever
committed and recalls General Assembly resolution 40/61 of Decem-
ber 9, 1985.
Many delegations agreed at this stage with the Kuwaiti delegation,
based on the fact that the Rome Convention was intended to apply
to all types of international maritime terrorism, regardless of who the
offender might be.7 ' However, it was felt that such an inclusion was
not necessary as Article 3 applies to "any person" and therefore does
not regard status as a defence. In this regard the sinking of the Green-
peace vessel, the Rainbow Warrior, in Auckland, New Zealand, by
agents of the French government is on point. In its first session the
Ad Hoc Preparatory Committee 7 had discussed an earlier proposa 7
for the inclusion of a new paragraph that would cover situations
where the naval forces of a state or other ship flying its flag which is
under the direct instruction of that state committed the offences.
Doubt was expressed by some delegations as to the feasibility of such
an article, as the whole ambit of the Convention was geared towards
offences committed by individuals and any attempt to include states
in the rationa personae of the Convention would raise fundamental
difficulties. No such provision appears in the Convention.
The international element that brings an offence into the realm of
the proscription by international law is contained in Article 4 (I).
It provides that the Convention is to apply if the ship in question is
navigating or is scheduled to navigate into, through, or from waters
beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea of a single state, or the
lateral maritime limits of its territorial sea with adjacent states. Some
delegations at the Conference were in favour of also including straits
used for international navigation but other delegations were of the
view that this was unnecessary as straits were already envisaged in
71 Supra note 62, IMO Doc. PCUA 2/5, at 12.
72 Ibid.
73 IMO Doc. PCUA 1/4, Mar. 16, 1987, at 22.
74 IMO Doc. PCUA 1/3/3.
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Article 4 ( i ) . Thus, the Convention will apply to these straits, without
prejudice to the legal status of the waters forming them in accordance
with the relevant rules of customary and conventional international
law.75
Article 5 stipulates that each state party shall make the offences
punishable "by appropriate penalties that take into account the grave
nature of the said offences." This convention relies upon the fragile
shield of fulfilment of treaty obligations in good faith, pacta sunt
servanda, as do the other conventions.
From the jurisdictional perspective, Article 6 follows the now
standard pattern of utilization of the territorial, active, and passive
nationality,76 and presence within the state principles. Similar to
Article 5(3) of the Hostages Convention, it does not exclude any
criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with international law.
It includes also the provision that was novel to the 979 Convention 77
in that it provides for jurisdiction to be taken also by states where the
offender is a stateless person who has his or her habitual residence in
that state or by a state that is the target of any attempt to compel an
act to be done or abstention from so doing. However, the bases of
jurisdiction are divided into two categories. First, Article 6 ( i ) pro-
vides that states parties shall establish their jurisdiction on the bases
of nationality of the flag state; and on the territorial principle and
the nationality of the offender. Article 6(4) mandates jurisdiction
on presence of the offender. Article 6 (2) follows with other optional
bases that states may also utilize: states where stateless persons are
habitually resident, the passive nationality basis, and target state basis.
Some controversial issues have been raised with respect to some of
these bases. Concerning the use of presence within the territory, it has
been argued that this should not be applied to nationals of a non-
party state.7" However, others have responded by arguing that to
limit the conventions in this way is to undermine their effectiveness
in combatting terrorism.7 9 It is submitted that this is the correct view.
75 IMO Doc. SUA/CONF./WP. i, Mar. 9, 1988, at 6.
7 Supra, note 56, Art. 5.
77 See Art. 6(5).
78 J. Paust, supra note 55, at 254, with respect to the same provision in the
Hostages Convention.
79 M. Halberstam, "Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and
the IMO Convention on Maritime Safety," (1988) 82 Am. J. Int'l L. 269, at
27 '. See also ibid., where the author argues further that terrorism is subject to
universal jurisdiction under customary international law and that the conven-
tions "create customary international law."
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To disallow jurisdiction over the offence in such circumstances would
be to eviscerate the potential of the conventions; it would be the
ultimate in third party frustration.
Concerning the passive nationality principle and the target state
principle, opposition was expressed during the deliberations of the
Ad Hoc Preparatory Committee. The concern with regard to the
passive nationality principle was that it would result in too many
states claiming jurisdiction.8"
Regarding the target state basis, it was suggested that it was unneces-
sary, as this will be co-terminous with the flag state."1 It was stressed
by other states that both bases were necessary to ensure maximum
potential for prosecution and that it would be better to have too many
states able to prosecute than none. However, votes taken at that stage
indicated overwhelming support for the passive nationality basis and
substantial but slightly lesser support for the target state principle. 2
Therefore both were included in the final product.
Article 9 provides that nothing in this Convention of 1988 shall
affect in any way the rules of international law pertaining to the
competence of states to exercise investigative or enforcement juris-
diction on board ships not flying their flag. This clearly deals with the
right of visit by warships on the high seas" and the search and arrest
of foreign flag vessels in a state's territorial sea and lately in its exclu-
sive economic zone and in the waters above its continental shelf for
violations of the laws that appertain to those zones.8 4
Article i o is yet another classic example of the principle of aut
dedere, aut judicare. The Convention does not provide absolutely for
extradition at all costs, but rather for extradition or the submission of
the case to the state's competent authorities for the purpose of prose-
cution, in accordance with the laws of that state. This is to be done
without exception whatsoever. Clearly, as with the other conventions,
this may be open to abuse. It does not read "extradite or prosecute."
Obviously it is open to prosecutorial discretion in the holding state.
The hope is that in fulfilment of its obligations a state's prosecutorial
so Ibid., 296. Note that the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of
the United States (1987), S. 402, provides that although not generally accepted
for all crimes, it has been increasingly used concerning terrorist acts.
81 Ibid.
82 See Halberstam, supra note 79, at 296 citing IMO Doc. PCUA 2/5, at 18,
June 2, 1987, para. 89.
83 See supra note 64, Art. i io.
84 Ibid., Art. I 1i (2).
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authorities will exercise that mandate in good faith. As with The
Netherlands' proposal at ICAO,8 5 some delegations at the IMO
would appear to interpret this to mean that the obligation to submit
for prosecution in one's own state only arises where an extradition
request is made and refused.86
Article i i (i) indicates that the offences contained in the Con-
vention will be deemed to be included in any existing bilateral treaties
between the parties. They undertake to include these offences as
extraditable offences in any future treaty. Article i I (2) makes the
usual stipulation that where a state makes a treaty a prerequisite for
extradition, it "may, at its option" consider the Convention as a legal
basis for extradition of the offences contained in the Convention.
Unlike the 1988 Protocol to the Montreal Convention, extradition is
not restricted to the state where the offence was committed. Article
Ii (4) provides that if it is necessary, the listed offences shall be
treated for the purposes of extradition, as if they had been committed
in a place within the jurisdiction of the state party making the request
and not only in the place where they actually occurred. Paragraph 5
of Article i i indicates that where the requested state party receives
more than one extradition request from states that have established
jurisdiction and decides not to prosecute itself, then it shall pay due
regard to the interests and responsibilities of the state party whose flag
the ship was flying at the time of the offence. It is not clear what this
latter provision actually means. One commentator has stated that
if it simply means that the interests of the flag state should be con-
sidered, this is already provided for as that state may request extradi-
tion. On this basis the provision is redundant. If it has a deeper
meaning, it is difficult to see what it is."
This Convention, as with its predecessors, does not actually speak
of terrorism and does not provide for political motivation to act as a
bar to extradition. Clearly the aut dedere, aut judicare provision in
Article i o( i) endeavours to cover the situation by providing for
submission to a state's own prosecutorial authorities, if extradition is
refused. This would be applicable should the refusal be based on such
85 Supra note 44.
88 See Halberstam, supra note 79, at 297. Note R. Rosenstock, "International
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages: Another Community Step
Against Terrorism," (198o) 9 Den. J. Int'l L. and Pol. 169, at 18S, where he
argues that, based on the legislative history of that Convention, there is no
doubt that prosecution is not dependent upon an extradition request.
87 Halberstam, ibid., 303.
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exception. Article 10(2) provides that the accused shall be guaran-
teed fair treatment and be accorded all the rights provided for by the
law of the state in which he or she is present.
At the first session of the Ad Hoc Preparatory Committee," a
later-removed Article 13 was considered. It was intended to safe-
guard existing treaties on asylum. Two alternatives were suggested:
first, that the provisions of the Convention should not affect any con-
ventional obligations on diplomatic asylum in force at the date of
adoption of the Convention, as between states bound by such obliga-
tions; second, that the Convention should not affect the application
of any conventional obligations on asylum. Objections were raised as
to the first proposal dealing with diplomatic asylum. As to the second
alternative, although some felt this to be basically acceptable many
delegations considered it unnecessary based on the last paragraph of
the preamble, which in the Convention as adopted reads "Recogniz-
ing the need for all states, in combatting unlawful acts against the
safety of maritime navigation, strictly to comply with the principles
of general international law." Draft Article 13 on asylum was deleted
from the text.
The remaining articles of the Convention of note deal with mutual
assistance in connection with this type of criminal offence. 9 States
parties are obliged9" to afford assistance with criminal proceedings,
including obtaining evidence at their disposal, in conformity with any
treaties on mutual assistance that may be in existence between them.91
In the absence of such bilateral treaties, they shall afford each other
assistance in accordance with national law.
As well as such assistance the important obligation is included to
co-operate to prevent any of the offences from occurring, first in
particular by taking all practicable measures to prevent preparations
in the territory of a state party for the commission of the Convention
offences either within or without that state.92 Second, they shall
co-operate by exchanging information in accordance with domestic
law and co-ordinate administrative and other measures as are appro-
88 Supra note 73, at 22.
89 Arts. 12-14.
0 Art. 12(I).
91 E.g., see the 1985 Treaty between Canada and the United States on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters, not yet in force, reprinted in ( 1985) 24 Int'l
Leg. Mat. 1092. Note also the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters, 1959 Eur. T.S. No. 30.
92 Art. x3(1)(a).
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priate to prevent the commission of offences." Again, these provisions
are modelled on the Hostages Convention."
Article 13 (2) provides for the duty to exercise "all possible efforts"
to avoid unduly detaining or delaying a ship whose passage has been
delayed or interrupted by the commission of an offence and in whose
territory the ship, passengers, or crew are present. It is reminiscent of
Article 9(2) of the 197o Hague Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, which similarly states that where the
aircraft or its passengers and crew are present, contracting states shall
facilitate the continuation of the journey of the crew and passengers
as soon as is practicable and shall without delay return the aircraft
and cargo to those persons lawfully entitled to possession.
Should a state party have reason to believe that a Convention
offence will be committed, it is obliged by Article 14 to furnish as
promptly as possible, in accordance with its national law, any relevant
information that it possesses to those states which it believes would
be the states with jurisdiction over the potential offence.95
It should be remembered that Article 14 of the Hostages Conven-
tion contained an "anti-Entebbe" clause, that stated that nothing in
that Convention should be interpreted as justification for the viola-
tion of the territorial integrity or political independence of a state in
contravention of the United Nations Charter. During the debate at
the IMO the issue resurfaced. Recent events such as the United States
bombing raids on Libya and the interception of the Egyptian aircraft
following the Achille Lauro seizure obviously prompted this. At the
first session of the Ad Hoc Preparatory Committee, the USSR pro-
posed that in combatting maritime terrorism, states should act in
compliance with international law and illegal acts undertaken to
combat such terrorism be inadmissible.9" The provision was not put
into the Convention proper, but reference in part is made in the
preamble.
As with the other international conventions on the various aspects
of international terrorism, any disputes between contracting states
concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention that
cannot be settled within a reasonable time by negotiation shall at the
request of one of the states be submitted to arbitration. If after six
93 Art. 13(0)(b ) .
94 See Arts. 4(a) and (b).
95 See also Art. 12 of the Montreal Convention.
96 IMO Doc. PCUA I/WP.17, Mar. 5, 1987.
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months from this request for arbitration the parties cannot agree on
the organization of the arbitration, any one of the parties may refer
the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request."7 Reser-
vations as to the dispute settlement mechanisms are allowed. 8
This Convention will enter into force ninety days after the date on
which fifteen states have signed it without reservation as to ratifica-
tion, accession, or approval, or have deposited an instrument of rati-
fication, acceptance, approval, or accession. 9
The adoption of the Convention does not rule out the imperative
of reducing the vulnerability of maritime vessels as well as ports them-
selves to terrorist attack. Clearly, one of the first safeguards is to train
personnel for such trouble and to increase security measures.
At the same conference in Rome, the IMO also adopted a Protocol
to the Rome Convention. This Protocol, of March i o, 1988, concerns
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Plat-
forms Located on the Continental Shelf."° As with the Protocol to
the Montreal Convention, this Protocol is open only to states parties
to the main Convention.1"' The IMO in adopting this Protocol, the
draft of which was prepared by the Ad Hoc Preparatory Commit-
tee,"0 2 recognized that the reasons behind the Rome Convention
apply also to fixed platforms on the continental shelf. The provisions
contained in Articles 5, 7, and io to 16 of the Rome Convention
apply mutatis mutandis to the offences set out in the Protocol, where
they are committed on board or against fixed platforms on the con-
tinental shelf.' In those cases where the Protocol does not apply on
this basis, it nevertheless applies when the offender or the alleged
offender is found in the territory of a state party other than the
state in whose internal waters or territorial sea the fixed platform
is located.'
For the purposes of the Protocol, a "fixed platform" is defined as
an "artificial island, installation or structure permanently attached to




100 See IMO Doc. SUA/CONF. i6/Rev. i, Mar. zo, 1988.
101 Ibid., Art. 5(4).
102 IMO Doc. SUA/CONF. 4, Aug. 28, 1987.
103 Supra note too, Art. i ( i).
104 Ibid., Art. 1(2).
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or for other economic purposes."' 5 Article 2 ( i) states that it is an
offence if a person unlawfully and intentionally by force or threat of
force or any other form of intimidation seizes or exercises control of
such a platform; performs a violent act against a person on board a
fixed platform if that act is likely to endanger its safety; destroys a
fixed platform or causes damage to it which again is likely to en-
danger its safety; or places or causes to be placed on a fixed platform,
by any means whatsoever, a device or substance which is likely to
destroy that fixed platform or endanger its safety or injures or kills
any person in connection with the commission or attempted commis-
sion of any of the offences. Article 2(2) provides for attempts,
abetting the commission of any such offence, being an accomplice,
and threatening to commit any of the offences if that threat is likely
to endanger the safety of the fixed platform. Article 3 indicates the
jurisdictional bases, which are basically the same as those in Article 6
of the Rome Convention. The only difference is to be found in Article
3 ( i) (a), which obliges states to take the necessary measures to estab-
lish jurisdiction over the offences set forth in Article 2 when the
offence is committed against or on board a fixed platform while it is
located on the continental shelf.
At the second session of the Ad Hoc Committee in 1987 some
delegations questioned whether a basis of jurisdiction should exist in
respect of offences committed against or on board a fixed platform
operated by a commercial firm which has its principal place of busi-
ness in the state in question." 6 In fact such a provision had existed in
an earlier draft.' It was pointed out by these delegations that since
platforms do not fly a national flag, there was a close link between
the commercial firms operating such platforms and the state where
the firms have their place of business. Such states, it was argued, had
an interest in protecting these platforms.' Other delegations could
not accept this.' 9 Their view was that extraterritorial jurisdiction
could not be given to states on purely economic grounds.' Clearly
this was a matter of high principle. The result was that such a provi-
sion was not included in the final text.
105 Ibid., Art. 1 (3).
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Article 4 reinforces the rules of international maritime law by
stating that the Protocol shall not affect in any way such rules per-
taining to fixed platforms on the continental shelf. Article 4 of the
draft Protocol prepared by the Ad Hoc Preparatory Committee
stated more specifically that the Protocol would not alter the existing
international rules concerning the competence of states to exercise
investigative or enforcement jurisdiction on fixed platforms located
on their continental shelves.'
The Protocol will enter into force ninety days following the date
upon which three states have signed it without reservation as to rati-
fication, acceptance, or approval or have ratified, accepted, ap-
proved, or acceded to it. The Protocol will not enter into force before
the Rome Convention itself is in force.'
2
CONCLUSIONS
These efforts at filling the gaps presented by new modes of inter-
national terrorism are to be lauded. Canada played an active part in
the adoption by consensus of all three agreements and, it is expected,
will ratify them once the requisite Criminal Code amendments are
in place to provide for extraterritorial jurisdiction over the offences
and presence of the accused within Canada being sufficient to provide
for prosecution in Canada.
It is again emphasized, however, that conventions will be toothless
paper tigers if they are frustrated by non-parties or if obligations are
not fulfilled in good faith. States should be encouraged at every
opportunity not to thwart the efficacy of the deterrent value of
these conventions. States should also be encouraged to increase
security measures and to co-operate to the greatest extent possible in
exchanging information and evidence not only for the purpose of
prosecution after the event, but most importantly to prevent it from
occurring.
"I Supra note 62, at 3.
112 Supra note ioo, Art. 6( 1).
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Sommaire
Le droit international et le terrorisme: des probkmes sculaires, des
objectifs difflrents
Le terrorisme ne connait pas de fronti~res. 2 la lumiere de plusieurs
incidents recents (les attaques aux airoports de Rome, Vienne et de
Francfort, la saisie du paquebot Achille Lauro en 1985 et l'explosion 4i
bord le vol Pan-Am 1o3 en Afcosse en 1988) on se rend compte que
beaucoup reste a faire pour mettre fin t ce fldau.
Get article traite des questions suivantes: (i) est-ce que l'enl~vement
des causes de ce fliau doit avoir prisiance sur l'adoption de nouvelles
conventions; (2) quelles sont les lacunes dans le re'seau de conventions
multilatirales existantes et (3) les mesures adopt es rdcemment par
I'OACI et par l'OMI pour rimidier a la situation seront-elles ifficaces?
